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forms throughout the rest of his life. But
readers be warned: do not invite a moral
equivalency test between these two
men. Orwell was a frustrated moralist,
while Churchill, for all his success, was
a politician—a man who, for most of
his life, sought power and its trappings.
There are many great books on Orwell
and Churchill. If you already have read
D. J. Taylor’s fine biography of Orwell
and cracked William Manchester’s
biography of Churchill, then Ricks’s
work may seem like tilled soil. Consider,
then, reading Christopher Hitchens’s
Why Orwell Matters or perhaps David
Reynolds’s In Command of History, a
fascinating story of Churchill’s production of his memoir The Second World
War and a sure testament to the
fact that those who win wars get to
write the history. Regardless, this is
a fine book for anyone interested in
reacquainting themselves with either
luminary, or for those curious to see
both in a complementary light.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought,
by Lukas Milevski. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2016. 175 pages. $80.

At first glance, telling the story of the
evolution of grand strategy would seem
to be a straightforward project. The term
grand strategy is encountered often in a
variety of disciplines, each of which attaches importance to the idea. However,
as Lukas Milevski demonstrates, the task
is far more challenging than it appears.
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic
Thought is essentially Milveski’s doctoral
dissertation. It is not a book especially
suited to the lay reader. Milevski is

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Spring2018Review.indb 165

B O O K R E V I E WS

165

thorough in this effort—he does not
appear to have overlooked anyone of
importance. Milevski explains that
one of the major difficulties associated with grand strategic thought is a
notable lack of a commonly agreed-upon
definition of the term. He identifies six
interpretations of the term in current
use, of which five are associated with
particular scholars and each of which
presumably has passionate adherents.
It is easy to imagine how Milevski
must have felt as, in his own words, he
began his doctoral research “believing
I knew what a grand strategy was and
how I would use the concept,” only to
discover that “there were simply too
many distinct and even contradictory
definitions of grand strategy” (p. 1).
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic
Thought takes a chronological approach
to the subject, and explains how the context of the times affected contemporary
thinking on grand strategy. Divided into
eight chapters, the work starts during
the Napoleonic Wars, anchoring grand
strategy’s origin as a military concept,
as “interpreted” by Carl von Clausewitz
and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini.
Those privileged to work within the halls
of the Naval War College and its Royal
Navy counterpart will not be surprised
to find that great maritime strategists,
notably Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian
Corbett, deserve places of prominence
as theorists of grand strategy. Milevski
reminds the reader that Stephen B.
Luce brought Mahan to the Naval War
College to teach strategy; however, as the
College initially lacked students, Mahan
had almost three years to refine this
thinking before giving his first lecture.
In comparing these two great naval strategists, Milevski identifies Mahan as the
more influential, but considers Corbett
superior as a thinker on grand strategy.
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The period bookended between the first
days of World War I and the last days of
World War II was productive for grand
strategists. Milevski details the rise of
J. F. C. Fuller and Basil H. Liddell Hart,
rightly described as “giants of British
strategic thought.” Also discussed are the
works of other strategists, notably Henry
Antony Sargeaunt and Geoffrey West.
The shadow of the First World War
looms heavily over this portion of the
book, and Milevski does an admirable
job of showing how the war influenced
the thinking of these strategists. Each
was determined to avoid the horrors
of the trenches and the near-fatal
blows dealt winners and losers alike.
Milevski explains how postwar thinking
about grand strategy took a different
direction in the United States. Edward
Mead Earle was a rising strategist, as
was Captain George Meyers, USN, who
lectured on strategy at the Naval War
College. Not since Mahan had U.S.
strategists engaged in “such serious,
in depth development” of the grand
strategic concept. Central to their work
was a perceived need to link military
ends to political results. Ironically, much
of this thinking would be discarded after
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki ushered in the age of nuclear
strategy. Milevski argues that scholars
forgot the “notion” of grand strategy as
their attention focused on nuclear strategy and limited-war theory. During these
discussions, more names joined the list
of scholars dealing with grand strategy,
including John Gaddis, Bernard Brodie,
Henry Kissinger, and Herman Kahn.
Milevski states that during this period
limited-war theory came into existence;
prior to this, national power was used
to prevent or win wars. During this
time, Milevski credits the Naval War
College with serving as the center of
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what little study on grand strategy was
undertaken. Milevski explains this
phenomenon by noting that nuclear
strategy protected and preserved the
Air Force, while limited-war strategy
served a similar function for the Army.
Lacking such intellectual cover, the
Navy stayed focused on grand strategy.
Grand strategic thought reemerged in
the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam
War. New academics took up the study
of grand strategy; Milevski identifies
John M. Collins, Edward N. Luttwak,
and Barry R. Posen. Paul M. Kennedy
gets credit for building on Liddell Hart’s
work, and Luttwak’s work is noted as
being similar to Earle’s, in that Luttwak’s
ideas of grand strategy are “effectively
synonymous with military statecraft.” In
contrast, Posen’s view of grand strategy,
according to Milevski, focuses on “relating military ends to political means.”
In addition to discussing the major
definitions of grand strategy, Milevski
also has included unique applications.
Here too the Naval War College
contributed to the field. Historian
John B. Hattendorf broke ground in
using grand strategy as an analytical
tool. The late William C. Martel, who
taught at both the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and the Naval War
College, turned the strategy-policy
relationship—“one of the core concerns
of strategic studies”—on its head.
In the end, Milevski concludes, “Grand
strategy remains a standardless, incoherent concept” (p. 141). Its interpretations
and explanations have been authorcentric, and instances of scholars such
as Collins and Kennedy being willing to
refer to earlier definitions of the term
are rare. Despite the decades of study,
there is still no common definition of
the term, and new definitions continue
to multiply. At present, according to
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Milevski, the state of grand strategic
thinking is “unhelpful” and requires
“rehabilitation” before that state can
change. To say that this conclusion is
surprising is something of an understatement, and it will be interesting to
see how many scholars of grand strategy
agree with Milevski in this regard.
RICHARD J. NORTON

A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace, by Harlan K. Ullman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2014. 214 pages. $34.95.

The legacies of the First World War
are many, and Harlan K. Ullman, a
respected national security practitioner
and academic, offers a thoughtprovoking snapshot of some of the
current challenges facing the United
States that can be linked back to the
war. The book focuses on current policy
debates, but simultaneously attempts
to relate back to historical events.
Ullman argues that the current threat
environment began revealing itself
when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the
archduke of Austria, thus launching the
First World War with only a handful of
bullets. Today, Ullman contends that
there are all kinds of Gavrilo Princips in
the world who can throw international
order into a tailspin. More significantly,
the author argues that the means and
methods of doing so have multiplied.
Ullman’s foundational argument is that
individuals and groups now can have
increased impact vis-à-vis the state. This
change occurred because of the gradual
unraveling of the Westphalian system
and the erosion of state sovereignty
over the last decades. Power is now
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diffused among so many people and
devices that they cannot be quantified.
The consequence is a world with “four
new horsemen of the apocalypse”:
failed governments; economic despair,
disparity, and dislocation; radical
ideologies; and environmental calamity. These represent the main threats
on which the United States should
focus, but unfortunately our policy is
grounded in the past, and our present
strategies address the symptoms instead
of the causes of these threats. This new
environment is difficult for governments
to manage; the United States in particular does not have a system in place that
enables it to cope. Ullman argues that
our political-military system merely
hops back and forth from one crisis
to the next without any real strategy.
The author argues that the United States
desperately needs sounder strategic
thinking. The extent of the national
debt means that resources for projecting military power will be more and
more limited. When a state’s chief
enemies possess no organized military
or economic base, traditional military
power exerts less influence. The United
States must become smarter in spending
for national defense and must formulate
strategies that take into account not
just Iran, China, and Al Qaeda but all
the overarching challenges it faces, as
well as the wild card scenarios that
can emanate from them. However, the
author keenly observes that this strategic
change is unlikely to occur, given the
dysfunction and vitriol in our political
system. Our elected leaders have a
short-term obsession with winning
elections and with the continuous
pursuit of dollars for campaign financing. As many others surely would agree,
Ullman worries that only major crises
can create the impetus for real change.
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